









In Philosophy in a Meaningless Life, I set out to reaffirm the question 
of the meaning of life in the face of outdated, positivistic instincts, the 
scientistic and anti-religious sentiment that pervades much of contemporary 
intellectual culture, and, in no small dose, I think, an existential discomfort 
that makes people reluctant to take up such questions. When I looked to 
recent discussions under the ‘meaning of life’ heading, I also felt the need 
to save the question from a group of contemporary value theorists who 
have tried to make it something it is not, and to show that the genuine 
article is just as interesting for non-believers as it is for those of faith. 
Prominent as this agenda became in the final product, however, it emerged 
from other aims.  
When I began to study philosophy, I wanted to know what it was – 
what made a discussion or topic specifically philosophical – and was 
amazed at the evasion, disinterest and even scorn which this natural 
question typically elicits within the profession. It has been neglected just as 
much as the meaning of life, and I came to think this was no coincidence; 
for as I argue in the book, when philosophy turned away from the meaning 
of life, it turned away from its own unifying theme. This pushed 
philosophy to the margins of culture. For outside the discipline (inside as 
well, for the most part), nobody has much of a clue what philosophy is 
supposed to be; and the one question you would have thought would be 
prime philosophical territory is officially not – I cannot think of a better 
recipe for getting people to lose interest. When people are exposed to 
philosophy, however, it can elicit a passion that is the envy of other 
disciplines. This suggested to me that a lack of self-consciousness was 
preventing philosophy from fulfilling its proper role. I trace this lack of 




Traditional works of philosophy, of the kind that still enthuse people 
about the subject, are typically wide-ranging, interconnected, squarely 
implicated with matters of natural interest, and aimed at a certain kind of 
systematic completeness of understanding; they are philosophy-like. The 
philosophy that predominates in the contemporary analytic tradition is 
piece-meal and fragmented; it is science-like. If the results of this work 
were to be pulled together into something of general interest, then you feel 
that, just as with science, this would have to be done in a popular book that 
abstracts from the difficulties to distil the interesting, take-home messages. 
I do not see this happening; and I am not sure that there are enough 
take-home messages around these days that people would find interesting. I 
worry that the interest is too often solely professional; and worse, that it is 
sometimes essentially professional, as competing ‘researchers’ vie to carve 
out their own distinctive niches in debates. All academics engage in the 
latter to some extent, of course, but in science, burying your head in 
whatever research programme is within reach can make a certain kind of 
scientific, rather than just professional, sense; for the visible, real-world 
effects of science are the collective result of lots of people doing just that. 
However this model strikes me as much less appropriate to philosophy, 
where the only visible, real-world effect is human understanding. Science 
provides us with technological solutions, as well as understanding which 
may or may not be of general interest; but philosophy produces only 
understanding.  
This understanding should not be confined to the profession if, as I 
think, philosophy deals with issues of natural human interest. I am not 
saying that philosophers have a duty to reach out to the public; I would 
have a written a very different book if that had been my main concern. 
Neither am I saying that the piece-meal approach is without merit; it instils 
discipline and responsiveness to peers, and much great philosophy has been 
produced this way. I am saying that since philosophy deals with issues of 
natural human interest, it should provide answers that cater to those 
interests; such that if people make the effort to understand what 
philosophers are saying, and they succeed, then they do not feel cheated.  
If you believe that philosophy as a piece-meal, collective endeavour 
will ultimately provide better answers than the traditional approach did, and 
which can consequently be disseminated to satisfy natural philosophical 
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interests, then it may still seem good to you that the piece-meal approach 
has eclipsed the systematic one. But then you must have faith that the 
collation and dissemination will ultimately transpire, rather than be 
indefinitely deferred as debates inconclusively fizzle-out to be replaced by 
new ones. That is, you must have faith that ways of philosophically 
understanding the world, and thereby meeting the natural human interests 
which the discipline arose from – and is still sustained by – really are being 
produced in this way. Moreover, you must have faith that debates come to 
dominate journals because they represent the state-of-the-art culmination of 
a history of philosophical discussion; and that they do not leave behind, for 
forgotten reasons and happenstance, large swathes of thought which only 
historians of dead philosophers continue to write about, but which will 
almost inevitably resurface in tomorrow’s leading debates.  
Lacking this kind of faith, I set out to write a traditional philosophy 
book. In that way, I was able assure myself that I was doing my job; for I 
take a long-view of my job-description. The topic I wanted to build this 
book around was consciousness. Consciousness was the topic of my Ph.D., 
and of all the topics I have come across in contemporary debates, it is the 
one that has gripped me the most. Moreover, I knew that consciousness 
would lead me into the metaphysics of time, which sounded good for my 
traditional aspirations, and I had been persuaded by Richard Rorty’s 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature that there was a deep connection 
between modern concerns about consciousness and the ancient problem of 
universals. So far so good; but I still needed an account of consciousness, 
and more importantly, I still wanted to know what philosophy was. 
For many years I struggled to formulate a physicalist account of 
consciousness that I could believe, for I was sure that physicalism must be 
true, even if, to echo Thomas Nagel, I found it incredibly difficult to see 
how it could be true. When my overarching concern about the nature of 
philosophical inquiry finally led me to ask why anyone would care, as I did 
so much, about how consciousness could be fitted into a physical world, I 
finally arrived at the question of the meaning of life. (For some days, a 
passage by Heidegger about science had been stuck in my head, like a 
song; then it just ‘clicked’.) From that point onwards, all the pieces began 
to fall into place. I soon rejected physicalism, and am now as thoroughly 
anti-physicalist as the proverbial ex-smoker is anti-cigarettes. This allowed 
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In the introduction, I begin by tackling the popular notion that the 
question of the meaning of life is hopelessly obscure. It is in fact perfectly 
straightforward, but in an intellectual culture dominated by science, and 
displaying strong anti-philosophical tendencies, the ‘what does it even 
mean, anyway?’-idea has provided an easy way of dismissing what is 
perhaps the most potent philosophical question of all. Another popular 
avoidance strategy is to interpret the question, however tenuously, as a 
question about the social meaning which we build up within our lives. I 
argue that this conflation stems from 19th century overreactions to the 
prospect of nihilism which sprang from the false assumption that nihilism 
is bad. But only a meaning of life could be bad, not the lack of one.  
The introduction ends with an appendix, in which I launch into a 
polemic against the contemporary analytic approach to social meaning; an 
approach which either dismisses, or tries to pass itself off as, inquiry into 
the meaning of life. I regret the tone I took here, partly because it may 
overshadow what I think are some good arguments against the main 
theories in the field, but mainly because the philosophers I attack revived 
interest in this crucial area, for which they should be congratulated; I made 
the latter point in the book, but a little too reluctantly. The only excuse I 
can offer is the rather pathetic one that I had been reading a lot of this stuff 
at the time, and some of it, especially the examples adversely comparing 
ordinary people with the great and the good, in terms of how meaningful 
their lives were deemed to be, had annoyed me. But I wrote with no malice, 
either here or in other pieces of the time, but rather with an excess of 
enthusiasm inspired by having seen my book to completion, or knowing 
that I soon would; anyone who knows me would have no doubt about the 
truth of this. My views have not changed or softened; in fact I have now 
seen even more fundamental problems with the social meaning agenda 
(Tartaglia 2016a). But in making my critique, I should have thought less 
about honesty and providing a good read, and more about courtesy and 
diplomacy. Since I targeted leading figures, I trust this was water off a 
duck’s back; I am sure it would have been, because great experience instils 
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wisdom of the kind I am still learning. But if I did offend anybody, then I 
sincerely and publicly apologise. 
In chapter one, which survived relatively unscathed from my first draft 
for over a decade, I claim that human life is meaningless, but does not 
normally seem like that because our social understanding of the world 
focuses our attention on goals; we normally have ‘something to do’. 
Nevertheless nihilism ticks away in the background and reveals itself 
through our susceptibility to boredom, which arises when our engagement 
with the social framework subsides; we find ourselves with ‘nothing to do’. 
After criticising Heidegger’s existentialist analyses of both boredom and 
anxiety, on the grounds that they are rooted in a misguided redemptive 
agenda (always a danger for creative philosophers, I think), I connect the 
question of the meaning of life to another of the great issues of natural 
philosophical curiosity: the cosmological question of why there is 
something rather than nothing. The connection is that life and the fact of 
existence are both things we naturally expect to be able to make a certain 
kind of sense of, but find that we cannot. In understanding that we cannot, I 
think we can satisfy the curiosity behind this question. The chapter 
concludes with a critique of Nietzsche’s conception of nihilism, which is 
much more loaded than mine is. 
In chapter two, I look at the various intellectual defence mechanisms 
which 20th century philosophers devised to deal with nihilism; the prospect 
of the truth of nihilism has evidently struck terror into many hearts. But 
there was no need for protection, consolation, or resignation, since nihilism 
is neither a threat nor a challenge; it only comes to seem that way because 
of inherited prejudice and intellectual error. Thus some have argued that 
nihilism renders life absurd; but such views only make sense within a 
religious perspective that the nihilist rejects. So nihilists should not be 
absurdists. Others try to avoid nihilism by defending the humanist view 
that people make their own meaning. Now people obviously do make their 
own meaning, but social meaning is a different issue: for there to be a 
meaning of life would require a transcendent context of meaning of the 
kind supplied by religions, and since humanists agree with me that there is 
no good reason to believe in one, they should accept the inevitable result, 
namely nihilism. A radical form of humanism is relativistic scepticism 
about objective truth, of the kind promoted by ‘postmodernists’ (an 
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entrenched and useful label, which most of the thinkers in question try in 
vain to disavow). But this can be discounted for obvious reasons; people 
can decide to uncover as many objective truths about the world as they like. 
I find the circumstances in which these radical, and radically implausible, 
views came to prominence, far more interesting than the views themselves. 
For they were yet another unnecessary response to nihilism: if nothing is 
true, so went the underlying thought, then nihilism cannot be either. 
In chapter three, I turned to my overriding concern: achieving 
philosophical self-consciousness by answering the question of what 
philosophy is. I have since produced a neater, more journal-friendly version 
of this chapter’s core theory about the unity of philosophy (Tartaglia 
2016b); but the position itself did not change. However, I am not 
particularly happy with how, within the book chapter, I subsequently went 
on to use this position to answer scepticism about philosophy. What I say is 
along the right lines, but the ideas had not been properly developed at the 
time. More importantly, I had not yet seen their importance; I was 
primarily thinking of philosophy-scepticism as a dumb and annoying meme 
which philosophers had taken too seriously. But I now see that it is much 
more than that. 
I begin the chapter by supporting my view that the question of the 
meaning of life is a natural philosophical concern by discussing the Epic of 
Gilgamesh, thereby taking us right back to the beginning of human 
literature. I was blown away, on first reading this work, when I discovered 
that its dominant theme is the meaning of life. Although I was nervous 
about treading into scholarly waters of which I know very little, I simply 
had to include it; for although some of my speculations about its intentions 
may be miles off, despite my best efforts, my central point – namely that 
the authors were thinking about the meaning of life – is something I would 
be very surprised to be dissuaded of. 
I go on to observe that although the question of the meaning of life is 
paradigmatically philosophical, the same can be said about the traditional 
questions of metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. To understand 
philosophy, as I see it, the connection between all of these areas of 
philosophical concern must be understood. The conclusion I came to is that 
the connection is the question of the meaning of life. More exactly, I claim 
that philosophy is rooted in attempts to discover the meaning of life 
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through a description of the world employing the concept of transcendence. 
Philosophy’s various and diverse problems have arisen in this attempt, I 
argue, but have now often become far removed from their natural sources 
of curiosity. Thus at the end of the chapter, I offer an account of 
constructive inquiry in philosophy, inspired by Meno’s Paradox, which is 
designed to counteract this problem; I have used it ever since.  
With my account of the nature of philosophy on the table, I put it to 
work in providing an answer to the rampant philosophy-scepticism that 
circulates in our day. This scepticism is based on philosophy’s apparent 
lack of a unified subject-matter, its a priori method, and its perceived lack 
of progress. The point I did not place nearly enough emphasis on in the 
book, however, is that these perceived problems arise through an invidious 
comparison with science. The basic thought, as I see it now, is that science 
is beyond reproach, philosophy has features that are different from science, 
and therefore philosophy is bad. A popular weapon against philosophy that 
science-worshippers use, is to disparage it as an ‘armchair’ pursuit; and 
defenders of philosophy have displayed dire political instincts by actually 
embracing this description. But seriously, do the action-men and -women 
of science really write their research papers on the go? Do they not sit at 
desks? When they get up, they sometimes conduct experiments, of course; 
because they are scientists. But when philosophers get up, they live and 
they think; the two often merge. Philosophers often think at their desks, but 
you would hope that scientists do too. If experimentation really is the 
be-all-and-end-all, I wonder what experiment I might have performed to 
see the connection between consciousness, the meaning of life, and the 
nature of philosophy, which inspired this book? And if thought is obsolete, 
how is scientific investigation to be rationally directed? In any case, the 
relation between philosophy and science is something I shall treat much 
more fully in the sequel to Meaningless, which I am currently preparing, 
and which is entitled Gods and Titans.  
When philosophers – predominantly in the English-speaking world – 
turned their backs on concerns like the meaning of life, I think that they lost 
their sense of identity and, looking around for a new one, became fixated 
on science; some of the results of this were scepticism about philosophy, 
aversion to self-reflection, and the piece-meal approach of analytic 
philosophy. But since this new model of inquiry was not universally 
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embraced, a split took root in 20th century philosophy. I think the situation 
is more complex with the continental side of the split, where interest in the 
meaning of life and in providing holistic understanding remained more 
prominent, and where it seems to have been art, literature and politics, 
rather than science and mathematics, that provided the new inspiration. I 
tentatively identify with the analytic side, because I favour argumentative 
analysis in clear prose, which that side better preserved from the 
philosophy that predominated before the split. However, I always 
remember one of my teachers telling me, with a knowing look, that, ‘you’re 
going to be a continental philosopher!’ 
In chapter four, I take up one of the hottest topics of debate within 
analytic philosophy since the 1950s: the problem of consciousness. 
Enthusiasm for this debate, which is essentially about whether science can 
tell us what consciousness is, shows no signs of abating. Philosophers who 
argue that consciousness cannot be incorporated into the scientific 
world-view of physicalism, or at least that it presents very serious problems 
for science which nobody yet knows how to overcome, continually 
infuriate philosophers who think that consciousness is obviously as natural 
as the birds and the bees, and hence that science can tell us everything there 
is to know about it. In turn, philosophers of the latter kind continually 
infuriate those of the former by implying, or even openly stating, that 
consciousness does not exist. What is primarily at stake in this debate, I 
have since argued, is philosophy’s voice: for physicalism is a metaphysical 
position which silences that voice (Tartaglia 2016c). Physicalism 
endeavours to be the final metaphysical position, which after its triumph, 
would quietly forget its own status as metaphysical. As I see it, then, the 
reason the two sides are so entrenched is that the struggle concerns 
philosophy’s future. If consciousness (or perhaps a related metaphysical 
concept that will replace it) continues to contextualise the scientific 
world-view for us, then philosophy will have a future. If not, then I doubt it 
very much; and so much the worse for us.    
After explaining the problem as vividly as I can, I begin by arguing that 
the distinction between indirect and direct awareness is a red herring in this 
area. For unless we deny that there are any conscious perceptual states, of 
the kind you and I are apparently in right now, then we have no choice but 
to think of experience as providing us with indirect awareness of the world 
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via a causally mediated process. I then argue that all the various attempts 
that have been made to incorporate consciousness into the physical world 
inevitably result in what I call ‘revisionism’; because they must revise our 
conceptions of either consciousness or the physical world, if they are to 
make physicalism work. But revisionism is untenable. The dominant kind, 
which seeks to revise our conception of consciousness, is untenable 
because our ordinary conception of consciousness will never go away – 
even from the minds of the revisionists themselves. No matter how well 
you internalise these theories, consciousness will not seem to be what they 
say it is. Not only will you go back to thinking of it in the ordinary way 
when you put the theory aside – that is, as some kind of inner presence, 
such as a visual image which only you can ‘see’ – but you will think of it 
that way even in the act of telling yourself you should not; no matter how 
often you repeat the physicalist mantra. This is hardly surprising, given that 
human beings have always thought essentially like this, as far as we know, 
and have constructed their entire world-view on this basis; a world-view 
that physicalists completely rely upon, thereby demonstrating their 
inattention to epistemology. How sensible would it be, I wonder, to insist 
that triangles have four sides, when every time you look at one, or think 
about triangles, they clearly seem to have three?  
Now my PC is currently displaying all the sentences I just wrote, and 
we could easily make it ‘say’ them too. It could say that, ‘I, the PC, seem to 
have inner experiences, and cannot shake this impression, despite my 
physicalist convictions.’ The revisionist thinks my situation is essentially 
the same as the PC’s would be; for as I argue in the chapter, this is the only 
stable version of physicalism about consciousness around, namely the one 
commonly known as ‘eliminativism’, but which now seems to be adopting 
the improved title of ‘illusionism’ (Tartaglia 2016c). However, I do not 
think the case for physicalism, such that it is, is remotely strong enough to 
get me to believe that the PC and I are in the same metaphysical boat; 
whereas I find the case for thinking that physicalism is a naïve metaphysic 
which philosophers embraced because of their reverence for science, to be 
very plausible indeed.  
Of course, physicalists will scream that they never said that I was just 
like my PC; and that is true enough. But the ones with a relatively stable 
position, the ‘illusionists’, do say that I only seem to be conscious because I 
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make false judgements. And though they will go on to say that my PC 
cannot make judgements as I can, this can only be through appeal to my 
greater physical complexity, integration with my environment, etc. That is, 
they will appeal to objective conditions that cannot possibly be relevant to 
understanding the objective / subjective gulf. A nice illustration of this 
point which I use in the chapter is that of the physical differences between 
colour- and black-and-white cameras (the old-fashioned kind). Told that 
the cameras are conscious, physical information will explain the difference 
between their visual experiences; but it will never tell you that they have 
visual experiences. Yet physicalism is a metaphysic which needs to be able 
to tell us when and why conscious experience arises from certain physical 
systems, but not others, as a condition of its own success. It does not avoid 
this requirement by substituting ‘false judgements that there are conscious 
experiences’ for ‘conscious experiences’; it just lengthens the terminology. 
If physicalists insist that the PC cannot make these false judgements, it is 
only because they think it is not conscious. But the task of explaining how 
consciousness (or: the right kind of false judgement) arises from the 
physical world is impossible. It arises because physicalism is a metaphysic 
that forgets its own starting point. 
For those wondering what this has to do with the meaning of life, the 
answer emerges in chapter five, which is the first of three chapters that 
provide the core of my metaphysic. In this crucial chapter, I present a new 
(I think) solution to the problem of consciousness, which is neither 
physicalist nor dualist nor idealist. According to the ‘Transcendent 
Hypothesis’, which like any philosophical hypothesis can only be tested by 
thinking through the implications, we have as much prospect of 
understanding how experiences could be brain states, as we would during a 
dream of understanding how dream experiences could be states of the brain 
within the dream. That is to say, no prospect at all: because dream 
experience does not ontologically belong to the dream-world. And 
likewise, if the hypothesis is correct, waking experience does not 
ontologically belong to the objective world: it is transcendent. Thus 
reflection on consciousness and the meaning of life bring us to the same 
place; and in a variety of ways, I think this has always been the direction of 
travel in philosophy. Moreover I think it has been the right direction, since 
reality is transcendent.  
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If reality is meaningless and transcendent, this immediately explains the 
distinctive dialectic we witness throughout the history of philosophy, in 
which repeated attempts, repeatedly resisted, have been made to close 
down the conceptual space of transcendence. The instinctive mistrust of 
transcendence which drives this process is mistaken, but it is a natural 
enough one for those who, like myself, do not think there is a meaning of 
life, and who accept that our objective, physical way of thinking about the 
world provides all the reason we need to dismiss this possibility. I still have 
the instinctive mistrust to the extent that I think most people have been 
attracted to transcendence because of the prospect of a meaning of life. But 
I overcome it by reflecting on the many rational lines of thought which 
have led philosophers to the same place, whatever their motivations; and 
also the mess which metaphysics gets into when it tries to deny 
transcendence. The equilibrium, I think, lies in a combination of nihilism 
and transcendence. I am fully aware that in defending this combination, I 
am likely to bifurcate my readers between those who like the nihilism but 
not the transcendence, and those who like the transcendence but not the 
nihilism; I am already beginning to witness this. But the consolation is that 
my account predicts this, which is a fact that some others may find 
persuasive. 
My guiding thought about consciousness is that it creates differential 
contexts of existence, and on this basis I explain that our positive 
conceptions of mental states are misrepresentations which allow us to 
articulate a world. As I follow through on this agenda into deeper 
theoretical waters than had hitherto been explored in the book, I try to show 
how the theory makes new sense of the distinctions between introspection 
and perception, appearance and reality, primary and secondary qualities, 
and realism and idealism. My hope is that those who follow me this far will 
no longer immediately associate ‘transcendence’ with mysticism, religious 
yearning or, indeed, general wackiness (I do not equate these, but many 
do). For in my view, the transcendent is everything. Name the most 
ordinary and well-understood thing you can think of; on my view, that 
thing ‘belongs’, in the loosest possible sense of the word, to transcendent 
reality. If it exists, then it must so ‘belong’; given that reality is 
transcendent. The transcendent, as I understand it, is not some ethereal 
realm that occasionally teases us with its elusive presence. It is all of this 
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stuff. My point is that our objective understanding simply cannot be 
capturing the nature of this stuff, given certain facts about the world, such 
as that we are conscious and exist in the present. But nevertheless, this 
objective understanding, which will only seem to be flawed if you make the 
mistake of interpreting it as a metaphysic, allows us to form the reasonable 
hypothesis that reality is transcendent, and thereby allows us to make 
metaphysical sense of it.  
In chapter six, I explore another philosophical route to transcendence, 
this time via time. Given the connection between transcendence and the 
question of the meaning of life which I set out before, this builds my case 
for the centrality of this question to philosophical inquiry, while allowing 
me to further develop the metaphysic of the Transcendent Hypothesis. I 
begin the chapter by bringing things down to earth for a while – by which I 
mean from the philosophical art of justification, to the matters of natural 
human interest which it ultimately serves – by revealing connections 
between common anxieties about time, and the philosophical claim that 
time is unreal. By this method, which I employ throughout the book, my 
metaphysic remains rooted and purposeful, with its value plain. I then 
move on to reject Heidegger’s revisionary conception of time – thereby 
completing the critique of Heidegger initiated in chapter one – before 
making the case that attempts to dissipate the counterintuitive 
consequences of the ‘block universe’ theory inspired by modern physics, 
are hampered by the consciousness revisionism which I diagnosed in 
chapter four.  
This sets the scene for my continued exploration of the consequences of 
the Transcendent Hypothesis, which, as I now argue, can show us how to 
accept the block conception, thereby paying due respect to objective 
thought, without being forced into an untenable denial of the fact that we 
experience the world from the privileged perspective of the present. The 
key to being able to make this move is realising that there is both an 
objective and transcendent sense of ‘now’, and that there is no more reason 
to think experience belongs to objective time than to objective space. I 
conclude that the characteristic perplexities of philosophical reflection on 
time result from attempting to superimpose the transcendent ‘now’ upon 
the objective world. I end the chapter by relating my position to ideas from 
the Chan / Zen Buddhist tradition. I think that Dōgen was driving at the 
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same point as me; but in any case, I find his example of firewood turning to 
ash, with which I open the chapter, fascinating and well-worth sharing. 
In chapter seven, I move onto the Western philosophical problem par 
excellence, namely the problem of universals. To illustrate: we experience 
many different particular red things, but what is redness itself? Whenever I 
teach this topic, I reflect that I could have been doing much the same thing 
at any time during the last two-and-a-half millennia; which is one reason 
why I like my job so much. Glorious as the problem is, however, it has 
become rather dusty and arcane, making it a challenge to get today’s 
students to empathise and fully engage; and when I read contemporary 
writings about the problem, although I am glad they continue to flow, I do 
sometimes wonder what the authors think they are up to. As such, I begin 
the chapter by trying to bring things down to earth again, showing that we 
actually do have natural concerns about universals, and that they dovetail 
with and motivate Plato’s monumental metaphysic of universals.  
After rejecting a strand of scepticism about the universal / particular 
distinction which originates with Nietzsche, I connect the ancient but still 
ongoing debate between nominalist and realist positions on this issue, with 
debates about consciousness and time. We witness exactly the same 
contours: efforts are made to either deny the existence of a phenomenon 
(real universals, consciousness, the temporal present), or else to squeeze it 
into the objective world. The motivation is always to close down the space 
of transcendence, within which a meaning of life might reside; but these 
efforts always fail because reality is transcendent. Thus the debates roll on 
and on. Once more I invoke the Transcendent Hypothesis to try to resolve 
the standoff. First I try to show how the problem of universals is just as 
intimately connected with consciousness as time is, by explaining how the 
roots of the modern conception of consciousness reside in Greek 
metaphysics. I do not think our conception of consciousness is ‘modern’ in 
any very substantive sense – I think it is natural, since people have always 
thought of their experience subjectively (Homer did; see Tartaglia 2017) – 
but I do think that philosophy came to thematise this conception more 
explicitly, as the appearance / reality distinction developed to fit a changing 
world. 
I then present a new argument to show that the instantiation of 
universals is required by our conception of experience as a self-sustaining 
xv 
 
reality. However I do not conclude that this implies the existence of 
universals, and thereby vindicates realism, because, as I have by this point 
been arguing since chapter five, our only positive conception of experience 
is a misrepresentation derived from the objective world. I end the chapter 
with a discussion of representation, which is a notion I previously needed 
to simply rely upon in order to get this far. This allows me to explain the 
ontological status which my metaphysic provides to the objective, physical 
world; and that is as far as the metaphysic develops in this book.  
I now read the final, eighth chapter as thoroughly transitional, since it 
begins to take up a theme, namely that of philosophical and scientific 
understanding in the midst of ceaseless technological advance, which will 
be central to the sequel, Gods and Titans; the new book will also give me 
the opportunity to further develop the metaphysic so as to incorporate free 
will, personal identity and truth. Providing this transitional link was 
certainly not my intention at the time, but nevertheless, it was surprisingly 
soon after I finished Meaningless that the plot of the new one started 
coming together. 
In this chapter, in addition to some inevitable recapitulation and 
consolidation, my main concern is with showing how my position 
establishes the (relative) autonomy of philosophy. Science cannot solve 
philosophical problems because its role is to describe the objective world; 
while philosophy’s concern is with the status of the objective world within 
the context of transcendence. I anticipate that philosophy will continue to 
oscillate between affirmations and denials of transcendence, but 
nevertheless welcome this as a fulfilment of its social role: to maintain a 
rational discussion about transcendence. Against populist, 
science-worshiping atheism, I argue that religious believers have seen 
something important, regardless of how they got there: for there is a 
transcendent context, and they are only wrong to think that it is a context of 
meaning. And in a thoroughly transitional ending (with hindsight), I argue 
that the provision of a rational way of thinking about these matters, as our 
social framework advances in ways that make it harder to see, is something 








And that is the book. If you are reading this symposium in the right 
order, then the main event is about to commence. But before it does, I want 
to do two things. The first is to thank the ten philosophers who agreed to 
comment on Meaningless. They have very generously given me the 
opportunity to reflect on and develop my work in the company of thinkers I 
really respect; money can buy you a Bentley Continental, but not that. It is 
particularly gratifying that the line-up includes both my teacher (Valberg) 
and my student (Balmer). Above all, however, I would like to thank the 
editor, Masahiro Morioka, since this was all his idea. Setting up this journal 
showed great foresight, and I suspect that its significance to philosophy 
will steadily increase. 
The second thing I shall do is respond to the three reviews of the book 
that have been published to date. Usually when I read book reviews – and 
always when I write them – I want to know how the author would respond. 
And yet there is no institutional mechanism for this; which to my mind 
removes a great source of philosophical value which academic reviewing 
could have. In the absence of a Journal of Philosophical Replies, then, this 
symposium strikes me as an ideal forum in which to take the measure of an 
extra three critical responses to my work. 
 
4. Leach, Hawkins and Bennett-Hunter 
 
In the review by Stephen Leach (2016), an elegant summary of the 
book is followed by two interesting criticisms. The first is that we have no 
way of knowing whether or not life is meaningless, and hence I have no 
justification for dismissing the possibility of a meaning of life as ‘idle’, as I 
like to put it. He says that, ‘All agree, including Tartaglia, that the obvious 
place to look for the meaning of life is in death. But we know nothing 
about death. Therefore we have no justification for describing one 
possibility as idle and another more likely.’ He concludes that since we 
cannot know what will happen after we die, and hence whether life is 
meaningful or meaningless, it follows that life is absurd. This is because we 
fear disappointment at death, but it is a disappointment we will never 
experience. Leach thinks this phenomenon is at the root of a gulf that exists 
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between how we think life should be and how it actually is, such that we 
are continually surprised by disappointment, but rationally should not be. 
This gulf permeates our social lives and thereby renders them absurd.  
If we all fear being disappointed at death on discovering that life is 
meaningless, it seems to follow that nihilists like me are secretly hoping we 
are wrong. If there is any truth to this, however, it is surely not that we 
incoherently fear a disappointment we will never feel, but rather that we 
fear death; that is, our last moments actually being our last moments, rather 
than the final countdown to an after-life. You might perhaps make some 
headway in persuading me that I would be happy to be wrong about 
nihilism if that meant transitioning at death into something new and not 
altogether worse. But then, I do not see anything inherently absurd in that. I 
can quite reasonably hope for something which I nevertheless consider to 
be overwhelmingly unlikely. And generally, I see nothing absurd in 
maintaining a positive attitude to life, so long as it is grounded in a 
reasonable assessment of the facts. It might, after all, be perfectly rational 
to try to escape from a burning building, even if you think it is 
overwhelmingly likely that you will die in there; you never know, you 
might just make it. Leach thinks we are constantly disappointed but should 
not be because we should expect the worst. That sounds like pessimism to 
me, which can be just as absurd as optimism if not grounded in a 
reasonable assessment of the facts. Irrational optimism generates 
unnecessary disappointment, but irrational pessimism generates 
unnecessary miserableness; and disappointment, unlike miserableness, is a 
spur to try again. 
The reason Leach thinks my nihilism is unjustified, and that we do not 
know what will happen at death, is that he neglects a central aspect of my 
position, namely that without misrepresenting it, we cannot know anything 
about transcendent reality except that it exists. At a first glance, this might 
seem to reinforce Leach’s point, since it would be illegitimate to form any 
positive hypothesis about what happens to consciousness at death; whether 
it ends or continues. Surely, then, according to my own principles, we 
simply cannot know. However, to ask about ‘what will happen’ inserts the 
question into the time of the objective world; we can ask the question only 
by misrepresenting consciousness as something it is not, that is, as 
something objective. The question only makes sense within the 
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misrepresentation we live by, then. And within this misrepresentation of 
consciousness as temporally ordered states in causal communion with the 
objective world, the states are correlated with the objective states of living 
human beings, and we have absolutely no reason to think they are 
correlated with dead bodies, or that they can float free of the objective 
world altogether; if the latter even makes sense. Objective thought does, 
however, give us plenty of reason to think that our attachment to the idea of 
an after-life, and indeed a meaning of life, is the product of wishful 
thinking and intellectual justifications designed to serve it. So given that 
the question directs us to objective thought, we must believe what it tells 
us. Similarly, when assessing nihilism, we have nothing to go on except 
objective thought; even though the recognition of transcendence opens up 
the idle possibility that religious believers guessed right. 
Leach’s second criticism is that the connection I make between 
boredom and nihilism is unwarranted. The connection in question is that 
boredom occurs when our immersion in the social framework drops away, 
thereby leaving us exposed to nihilism, such that our susceptibility to 
boredom shows a latent sensitivity to this truth, of the kind which 
metaphysics can exploit. But Leach says that it is just as likely – although 
he seems to actually think it is more likely – that boredom is a product of 
our immersion in the framework which ‘incites’ thoughts about nihilism. 
Thus rather than boredom being a window onto nihilism, it may rather be 
that belief in nihilism is a product of boredom. This is clearly where he 
thinks I went astray, because earlier in the review, he surmised that I am 
someone who is highly susceptible to boredom. Maybe so, Dr. Freud, but 
idiosyncratic entry points to philosophy are either false starts or lucky 
breaks: the reasoning determines which. 
Boredom has its uses within the framework, to be sure. When it hits in, 
it can make you realise that your time would be better spent elsewhere. 
However it is not always like that, for tasks sometimes bore us when we 
have no doubt that pressing on is the best possible way to meet the 
framework commitments that matter most to us. Boredom is essentially 
disruptive of our framework engagement; evidently so when it is just a 
hindrance, but equally so when boredom will ultimately be useful to that 
engagement by providing the spur to re-evaluate our goals. However, in all 
cases the phenomenon is the same: we are not gripped by goals. 
xix 
 
Suppose Leach is right that this is a kind of framework engagement; 
perhaps it developed because of its potentially useful consequences, or 
perhaps it is an aberrant engagement that arose through a kind of 
malfunction. Thus although it would seem to me in boredom that the goals 
do not grip me, they actually do: in a boring sort of way. The objection 
would then be that when my goals grip me in this special, boring way, I 
mistake this for them not gripping me at all, and thereby falsely come to a 
nihilist conclusion. However, it does not follow that the conclusion is false. 
For even if I can never shed my immersion in the framework, the nihilist 
thoughts this special kind of immersion incites in me will still reveal that 
my goals are a product of ordinary immersion, rather than the meaning of 
life; for the special immersion will never generate its own goals, even if it 
inspires more ordinary immersion which does. With the spell of ordinary 
immersion broken, then, I am better positioned to realise the truth of 
nihilism. I describe this as boredom providing us with an attunement to 
nihilism. So even if Leach were right, it would not affect my case. 
However, I still think my description is better, because I find it less natural 
to say that when bored, our attitude towards goals becomes one of 
boredom, than that certain outcomes cease to present themselves as goals.  
Stephen B. Hawkins (2017) begins his review by calling me ‘a 
disappointed physicalist’. He is thinking of the fact that I used to be a 
physicalist – but then, why would that make me a disappointed physicalist? 
Surely, the situation is just that I once held the belief that physicalism is 
true, and later found reasons to abandon it. To be disappointed, you must 
have wanted your belief to be true. But why would anyone want 
physicalism to be true? I can think of two reasons. The first would be that 
you want it to be the case that human beings can tell the final, definitive 
story about reality by means of physical science. The motivation here 
cannot be curiosity about what the story amounts to because physicalism is 
a metaphysical view about the story – it claims there is one to tell and that 
physics can in principle tell it – so it must rather be something to do with 
human dignity or the prestige of science. If there turned out to be a reason 
why the final metaphysical story can never be told by science, then that 
might be disappointing, if it revealed human, or scientific, limitations. A 
second reason you might want physicalism to be true stems from 
anti-philosophical sentiment. Thus you might think that describing the 
xx 
 
nature of reality is obviously something only science can do, and be 
annoyed that anti-physicalist philosophers question the metaphysical status 
of the scientific description of the world. Physicalism promises to put an 
end to all of that nonsense. 
If you want physicalism to be true for either of these reasons, however, 
then I doubt you will ever meet with disappointment. For you will not be 
open to the truth or falsity of physicalism, but rather driven by pride in 
scientific achievement, disdain for philosophy, or both. No matter how 
good the argument against physicalism which such a person hears, they are 
unlikely to be persuaded unless it comes from science itself; and it is hard 
to see how it could. So the notion of a disappointed physicalist strikes me 
as rather fanciful. Personally, I am just an ex-physicalist; one who finds it 
difficult to imagine wanting a metaphysic to be true, unless it were of the 
religious kind that holds something positive in store for us. I would like to 
think that the majority of physicalists in academic philosophy today are like 
this. 
Hawkins’ image of me as a disappointed physicalist frames his whole 
reading of the book, I think. He sees my Transcendent Hypothesis as a case 
of settling for second-best. Since I could not have the physicalist 
metaphysic I wanted, I instead worked up ‘a variety of Kantian idealism, 
shaped by the scepticism of Hume, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and some 
strands of Chinese philosophy’, in accordance with my overriding concern 
to stay on the right side of both our scientific and everyday understandings 
of the world. The only kind of reason I could stomach for rejecting 
physicalism, pertains to limitations on human understanding which do not 
impugn or challenge the scientific picture in any way, but rather just place 
it within a wider, philosophical perspective. Taking this philosophical 
perspective must neither challenge science, nor remove us from our 
common-sense, everyday understanding of the world. In short, philosophy 
must be tangential to science and not at all wacky. Well, I do think a bit 
like that, so this is certainly an insightful review. Hawkins disapproves, 
however. He thinks the price I pay to ‘shield’ philosophy from science is 
that of ‘hiding it away in a corner where, at best, it transforms your attitude, 
and nothing more’; and that I offer only ‘the status quo and the freedom of 
indifference in a universe beyond our comprehension’. Hawkins, by 
contrast, thinks philosophy should ‘demand ever deeper understanding’ and 
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‘make a difference in a real world where real people govern themselves by 
what really matters.’ He seems to think my philosophy is conservative and 
apathetic. 
I find this reading both intriguing and disconcerting; but I am pretty 
sure it is not sustainable. In a world where scientism, and its philosophical 
extension, physicalism, is trying to discredit attempts to place the scientific 
description of the world within any context other than its own, thereby 
leaving it as the unassailable absolute truth, there is nothing timid or 
browbeaten about my view that objective thought must be placed within the 
context of a transcendent reality whose nature it can never capture; how is 
that hiding philosophy away in a corner? As to my affirming of the status 
quo, I do this in two ways, both of which I think are sound. Firstly, I do not 
see any credible way of disputing what science tells us about the world; or 
any good reason to try to do so. Secondly, I do not see any credible way of 
disputing what our everyday framework understanding tells us about what 
life basically amounts to. That picture certainly presents what life seems to 
be, and to argue that it should not seem that way, or that the seeming covers 
over an incompatible reality, would require exactly the kind of positive 
metaphysic of a meaningful reality which the book argues is untenable. 
There is, however, a more philosophically significant sense in which I am 
certainly not affirming the status quo; namely by arguing that reality is 
meaningless and transcendent, and building that argument upon 
philosophical considerations about consciousness. If that argument is 
correct, then Hawkins’ demand for ‘ever deeper understanding’ is not 
going to get us any further than the fact that reality is transcendent. 
Hawkins’ line of criticism, according to which I should have been 
trying to completely revolutionise our understanding of the world and 
thereby spur us into positive action by revealing what ‘really matters’, did 
make me wonder what he himself thinks. A reviewer need not reveal their 
own views, of course, but I did become curious about the nature of the 
higher stance from which my position was being criticised. A clue is 
provided, perhaps, when he says that, ‘it should not surprise us to find 
boredom elevated to a philosophy of life in a book that makes so much of 
the “everyday”. Philosophy can do more.’ Hegelian is my best guess; 
possibly Thomist.  
In any case, the most explicit criticism in the review is that I should not 
xxii 
 
have assumed that objective thought is our only substantive interpretation 
of reality. Hawkins seems to think that philosophy can provide a better, and 
at least equally substantive, interpretation of reality. Thus he sees a tension 
between my aim of preserving the everyday understanding of objective 
thought, and making maximum sense of the world with philosophical 
concepts. He thinks I am not entitled to assume that philosophy can never 
overturn objective thought, unless I can supply an argument to show that no 
explanatorily comparable alternative is possible. In short, my trust in 
objective thought is uncritical, dogmatic, and – once again – apathetic. I 
back it up with an appeal to everyday understanding, but in fact everyday 
understanding is silent on many issues that philosophical concepts can 
elucidate, such as the nature of matter.  
I think there are two main kinds of reason why someone would want to 
overturn objective thought. The first is to make sense of consciousness; or 
some other feature of reality which seems to resist incorporation into the 
objective world as a matter of principle. The second is to make room for a 
competing form of description which affirms a particular meaning of life; 
and possibly thereby provokes personal or social action of a kind designed 
to get us in touch with that meaning. Now in the book I argued that 
consciousness is transcendent. If that is right, then it is a mistake to think of 
objective thought’s inability to describe consciousness (or other related 
phenomena) as a shortfall. Hence the first kind of reason for wanting to 
overturn objective thought is explained away. I also argued that life is 
meaningless, and so the ultimate nature of human life does not provide any 
clues about what we should be doing with ourselves: these are matters we 
have to decide. That removes the second kind of reason. As I see it, then, 
the position I defended in the book removes any compelling reason for 
wanting to replace, or seriously question the legitimacy of, objective 
thought. Everyday objective thought tells us little about the nature of 
matter, I grant, but its extension – namely science – certainly does. If my 
account of consciousness is on the right track, then we have no reason to 
think there is anything wrong with a broadly objective account of what 
appears within the context of conscious experience. And in any case, 
common sense alone, it seems to me, dictates that we are never going to get 
an alternative of remotely comparable substance.   
The review by Guy Bennett-Hunter (2016) is a prime example of the 
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bifurcation of critical response I expected; he likes the transcendence but 
not the nihilism. The central criticism the review revolves around is that I 
fail to refute the best argument for the claim that there is a meaning of life 
– the one Bennett-Hunter agrees with – and hence fail to establish nihilism. 
He says that I do not explicitly address this argument, despite promising to 
do so in the introduction, but that my implicit response not only fails, but 
is, he strongly implies, outrageous. This is because it amounts to an 
invitation to stop thinking about the matter; philosophers ‘of all people’ 
should never do this, he says, thereby neatly using my own turn of phrase 
against me.   
The argument in question is that we would not be able to carry on if 
nihilism were true, and so given that most of us do carry on, there must be 
a meaning of life. Now a great many of us apparently think nihilism is true, 
of course; atheism is on the rise, and signs in cafes saying that life is all 
about ‘the journey, not the destination’ are very popular. Perhaps such 
people are psychologically spurred on by the humanist belief that we ‘make 
our own meaning’. I do not think so, however, because this kind of 
intellectual justification comes only after the event, and popular as this one 
has become, it is obviously not universally believed; not by me, and not by 
a great many people who would deny that there is a meaning of life, 
without having considered the philosophical question of what motivates 
goals in its absence. Bennett-Hunter, however, thinks motivation requires 
the psychological spur which belief in a meaning of life provides. But he 
fails to realise that this plays no part in his objection. For according to that 
objection, whether you believe there is a meaning of life or not, there can 
be no motivation without a meaning of life. If the meaning of life is there, 
we can feel motivated; but if it is not, we cannot.  
Bennett-Hunter gets close to realising this implication when he says, 
‘there is a logical [my emphasis] as well as a psychological need to 
suppose that life has meaning and nihilism is false.’ He believes in both 
needs, but only the logical one has any role in his objection. Whether or not 
we have a psychological need to believe in a meaning of life makes no 
difference. Presumably, he thinks that those of us who would deny that we 
have any such need nevertheless have it at some undetected psychological 
level. But even for those who fully recognise this need in themselves, and 
think it is being satisfied, the psychology would be completely ineffectual 
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if the meaning of life were not there. Should the meaning of life somehow 
recede, then they, like the rest of us, would slump to the ground.  
This view is unstable according to Bennett-Hunter’s own principles; as 
well as independently implausible. If he knows that nihilism is impossible, 
given that goals motivate us, then he must know some feature of 
transcendent reality which is required for motivation. We know square 
circles are impossible because we know about squares and circles. To know 
that nihilistic motivation is impossible, then, would require knowing 
something about both meaningless realities and motivation. But if the 
reality is the objective world, we already know that nihilism and motivation 
can coexist: motivation would be part of such a meaningless, objective 
world. If it is transcendent, however, then we cannot know anything about 
it that would rule out motivation. Bennett-Hunter’s main philosophical 
interest is in ineffability, and his interesting and original work argues that 
reality is both transcendent and ineffable (Bennett-Hunter 2014). As such 
he, of all people, should not be claiming that meaninglessness is impossible 
for transcendent reality: if we cannot say what it is, then we certainly 
cannot say what is or is not possible for it. So long as it is even possible for 
transcendent reality to co-exist with motivation, however, then we have no 
reason to look to a metaphysic of transcendence to explain motivation; for 
objective thought does the job perfectly well. Human beings naturally want 
things because this allows them to survive and find satisfaction. That seems 
to me a perfectly good explanation of why we find it so easy to be 
motivated.  
I am criticised for encouraging philosophers to stop thinking; but what I 
really said is this. Think about nihilism as long and hard as you like. 
Eventually, as a plain matter of fact, you will stop; and when you do, if you 
are psychologically healthy, you will probably find goals motivating you 
just as much as they always did, despite the fact that you were recently 
considering the intellectual position that they never terminate in a meaning 
of life. If your reflection went well, then you will have endorsed nihilism as 
a non-evaluative position, and hence will never have thought that you 
ought to resist the natural motivation kicking back in: for nihilism does not 
say that we ought not to be motivated by ordinary goals. If Bennett-Hunter 
wants the reflection to run on and on, then fine; but I suspect this is just 
because he does not like the natural terminus – and that is because he is still 
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thinking of nihilism as evaluative, and negatively so. Saying that the 
meaning of life is ineffable sounds to me suspiciously like what someone 
might be expected to say if they were determined to avoid nihilism, could 
not find the meaning of life, and were intrigued by the history of religious 
mysticism. 
When in the introduction to the book I mentioned the kind of argument 
which attracts Bennett-Hunter, in connection with David Cooper’s views, I 
took the worry behind it to be that without belief in a meaning of life, of the 
kind that is still widespread, people might find their commitment to goals 
drain away. That is why I said that the worry, ‘overestimates the 
importance of philosophy’; meaning that our commitment to goals can get 
along just fine with or without philosophical justification. I addressed this 
worry at length in chapter two; I was not thinking of Bennett-Hunter’s view 
that the meaning of life sustains our motivation directly, rather than 
indirectly via our belief in it. As to his complaint that my views on nihilism 
and transcendence do not connect up, I really do not know what more I 
could have done to make the connection plain and to place it squarely at the 
centre of the work. My account of the unity of philosophy depends on the 
connection, and I use it to explain the typical lines of opposition to be 
found in debates about consciousness, time and universals. I use the 
connection to explain opposition to nihilism, opposition to transcendence, 
and the distinctive value of philosophy. These explanations are backed up 
by detailed descriptions of the ways we misrepresent transcendent reality. 
Present me with an apparently ineffable experience, and I will do my best 
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